The German open-ended real estate fund industry was strongly hit by massive outflows in the course of the global financial crisis. In total, 18 public and institutional real estate funds had to stop the redemption of shares and were ultimately forced to liquidate their portfolios. Investors of these funds either have to await the stepwise liquidation of the funds' assets, which can take up to several years, or they can opt to sell their shares on the secondary market, often at a substantial discount to the Net Asset Value (NAV Spread). This paper attempts to explain the NAV Spread of distressed German public open-ended real estate funds. The unique monthly dataset contains fund specifics and macroeconomic indicators for the entire relevant period. Fundamentals like the leverage ratio and the liquidity ratio as well as industry-wide spillover effects from fund closures affect the NAV Spread. Moreover, we detect a considerably influence of macroeconomic uncertainty explaining the discount to NAV.
Introduction
Open-ended real estate funds are common in several countries. Open-ended real estate funds invest in direct real estate. Investors were able to redeem their shares daily to the investment company whereas the share price was determined by the Net Asset Value (NAV) of the real estate assets. The liquidity transformation between the very illiquid direct real estate assets and the daily liquidity of the shares is a key advantage, but exhibits a potential "bank run" risk (Weistroffer & Sebastian (2015) , Bannier et al. (2007) , Sebastian & Tyrell (2006) and Sebastian (2003) ).
In detail, the vehicle is structured as follows. First the funds are managed by an investment company (KVG).
4 Independent evaluators appraise the entire real estate portfolio once a year. In addition, one twelfth of the real estate portfolio is reappraised each month in order to increase the accuracy of potential changes in market value (Fecht et. al (2014) . The investment company must keep at least 5 % of the invested capital as liquidity in form of cash and short-term money market deposits to diminish the "bank run"
risk. An open-ended real estate fund closes if the daily redemption requests exceed the liquidity reserves. 5 After 24 months of being closed, the fund is forced to sell all properties and distribute the proceedings to the investors. Since October 2008, 18 public or semi-institutional funds closed and were forced to liquidate the funds' assets. 6 Usually the liquidation takes several years. For the liquidation, the national German banking supervision (BaFin) sets an individual time line for every distressed fund (between 3 and 5 years). Afterwards, the investment company is no longer in charge to manage the further liquidation. Instead, a third-party depository bank will sell the entire real estate portfolio.
Investors of these funds either have to await the stepwise liquidation of the funds' assets or they can opt to sell their shares on the secondary market. This induces a large supply of fund shares on the secondary market. Hence, market prices must be below the funds NAV to realign supply and demand, which caused substantial NAV Spreads. Moreover, a fund closing leads to a shift from relatively stable valuation based asset prices to more volatile 4 Kapitalanlagegesellschaft (KVG). 5 A "closed" fund no longer allows the investors to redeem their shares. From now on investors are forced to sell their shares on the secondary market. 6 In succession of this open-ended real estate fund crisis the German law regime was modified several times.
Nevertheless, all distressed open-ended German real estate funds are liquidated under the legal force of the former investment law (InvG, effective from 1/1/2004 -7/22/2013). The continuous closing of these funds circumvent the law adjustment to the latest one (KAGB, effective since 7/22/2013).
transaction based share prices. Economically, the event of a fund closure can also be viewed as the loss of a "buy-back"-guarentee. Before the fund closure, the relatively stale NAV price was guarenteed to the investors. The loss of this "buy-back"-guarentee implies uncertainty, which requires a risk premium, namely the NAV Spread. opportunities. Figure 1 shows that both, the valuation (NAV) and the secondary market price, decline over time, which is due to two separate effects. First, property deacquisitions lead to a decrease of the funds substance, second we observed an impairment of the valuation of the remaining properties over time. After the first funds were forced to suspend the redemption of their shares (i.e. the share price is no longer guaranteed by the KVG), a substantial deviation of pricing and valuation occurs. We use fund specifics like the leverage ratio, the liquidity ratio, the share of institutional investors and the management costs to explain the fund specific, idiosyncratic part of the NAV Spread. In addition, we also introduce variables with no idiosyncratic variation. These variables are only dependent on the time dimension and will, therefore, explain the homogeneous part of the NAV Spread. Amongst these variables we use count variables for the 7 On average, the stock prices drop to 60 % of the net asset values.
number of fund closures and the number of funds under liquidation. In addition, we control for the fund flows of the whole asset class. These variables are used as a proxy for spillover effects between open-ended real estate funds. In addition, we include macroeconomic uncertainty indices to take the ever-increasing role of economic uncertainty in the aftermath of the global financial crisis into account.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we present the used literature. Afterwards, we introduce the data and methodology and show the empirical results. Finally we end our analysis with a conclusion.
Literature Review
Closed-end mutual funds are traded on the secondary market often at a substantial discount to NAV. The Closed-End Fund Puzzle literature investigates these funds' discounts. In detail, the combined price of single stocks on the stock market differs from the price of a closed mutual fund, which simultaneously holds a variety of these stocks in a portfolio (Cherkes 2003) . The pooling and a professional fund management seem to reduce the portfolio worth.
Even though the environment for real estate funds is fundamentally different, the pricing of distressed open-ended real estate funds shows some similarity with the Closed-End Fund Puzzle described above. 8 Specifically, the price of those funds on the secondary market tends to be lower compared to the sum of the properties NAVs. According to Lee et al. (1991) closed-end fund discounts are caused by private investor sentiment, so called noise
traders. An irrational change in investor sentiment lead to larger discounts. Therefore, holding a closed-end mutual fund portfolio exhibits a larger risk, hence uncertainty, than holding the underlying fund's assets. Additionally Lee et al. (1991) detect that individual fund discounts move together over time. Barkham and Ward (1999) find evidence for this noise trader hypothesis for listed property companies in the UK. 
Fund Specifics
Clayton et al. (2000) find a positive influence of the debt to equity ratio to existing premia for REITs. An impairment of the fund's assets value reduce the value of the fund shares. A high leverage ratio amplifies this effect. For instance an impairment of the fund's real estate property values by 10 % given a leverage ratio of 50 % justifies a NAV Spread of 20 %. This leverage ratio risk should be considered in the market price. Therefore, we use the fund's leverage ratio as an influential factor to explain the NAV Spread.
A distressed fund is forced to sell the entire real estate property. As a result, the fund's liquidity always raises over time. The liquidity ratio has no market or appraisal risk and can be seen as safe money to the investors.
After analysing the open-ended fund crisis in 2005 /2006 in Germany Fecht et al. (2014 state, that a lower liquidity ratio lead to an increase of the redemption of shares by the investors. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship. Higher liquidity ratios should lead to lower NAV Spreads.
We use the management costs as an additional fund specific factor. Investors may consider the management fees as too expensive, which may lead to less demand on the secondary market. Nevertheless, Malkiel (1977) and Lee et al. (1991) find no significant influence of the management costs on the NAV Spread. In contrast, Gemmill and Thomas (2002) state that small closed-end funds, which often display large management costs, exhibit a larger discount. We include the fund specific total expense ratio (TER) and expect a positive influence on the NAV Spread.
According to Pontiff (1996) , low dividend payouts lead to larger NAV Spreads. Gemmill and Thomas (2002) as well as Cherkes (2003) support this view. Malkiel and Xu (2005) confirm the negative relationship between the level of dividend payments and the NAV Spread. Investors receive so called extraordinary payouts from the stepwise liquidation of the fund's real estate assets. We suggest that distressed funds with considerable extraordinary payouts endure a shorter total repayment period for the total investment. Associated with the lower capital commitment there should be a lower risk premium (e.g. NAV Spread). Barclay et al. (1993) conclude that closed-end funds with a large share of blockholder display a larger discount. In contrast, Morri et al. (2009) find an adverse effect of the share of institutional investors to a NAV Spread for Italian closed-end real estate funds. Brounen, et al. (2010) state that the share of institutional investors should diminish the effect of sentiment for NAV Premia in UK REITs. Due to the low price volatility, institutional investors abused the open-ended fund structure as a cash equivalent before the fund crisis. After closing, all funds show a substantial price volatility on the secondary market. Therefore, institutional investors will reevaluate the asset class and may potentially sell their shares.
The fortitude of this supply shock depends on the extent of the institutional share holdings.
This potential risk could affect the secondary market price and lead to a larger NAV Spread.
On the other hand, the dataset consists exclusively of closed funds. A larger share of well informed professionals holding shares, despite of the closure, could indicate a high fund's quality. Hence, institutional investors consider the funds to be undervalued at their current secondary market price. We include the particular share of institutional investors to estimate the effect on the NAV Spread.
In addition, the fund size is used as a further fund specific factor. This is due to capture We use the following variables, which are related to the funds' real estate portfolio quality.
The fund specific tenancy rate serves as a proxy for the current funds' portfolio quality. Wurtzebach et al. (1991) stated that high office vacancy rates, hence, low tenancy rates, diminish returns of commercial real estate in the United States. Furthermore, we consider the funds' past performance as a measure of the funds' past portfolio quality. In addition, we use the growth of the funds' target markets GDP as an estimator of the future development of the funds' real estate portfolio. We expect markets with higher growth rates to show lower NAV Spreads. 
Industry-Wide

Macroeconomic Uncertainty
The observation of a considerably uniform progression of the individual NAV Spreads strengthen the assumption that macroeconomic events contribute to the NAV Spread to a significant amount. Therefore, we use two popular uncertainty indices to control for macroeconomic influence. First, we employ the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index by Baker, Bloom and Davis. This index is used for a plethora of research (e.g. the European Central Bank (2013) 
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Data Sources and Sample
We use a panel model framework to analyse 9 distressed funds over 73 months from October Several funds are now managed by a depository bank. The current reporting provided by these banks includes far less information about the funds' fundamentals.
Definitions
According to Lee et al. (1991) and Barkham & Ward (1999) the NAV Spread is calculated as the difference between the current NAV and the contemporary fund's market price divided by the current NAV. The fund's NAV is published by the KVG for each fund on a daily basis. Whereas the market prices are provided by the Hamburg-Hannover stock exchange.
Prices and values in the dataset are based on the respective end of month figures.
Fund Specifics
The provided data displays several fundamental variables like the leverage ratio, the liquidity ratio, the tenancy rate, the total expense ratio (TER), the fund size as well as the fund performance. These key figures are calculated based on law-enforced industry standards. We also introduce the Economic Growth Target markets variable as well as the extraordinary payouts and the share of institutional investors. The leverage ratio is defined as the relation of the funds debt and the funds gross asset value (GAV). The liquidity ratio shows the relation between the fund's cash equivalents and the GAV. The Economic Growth Target Markets variable is calculated as the weighted sum of the monthly GDP growth in the individual funds' target country markets. The GDP data is provided by the OECD. The tenancy rate shows the proportion of rented and overall space of the real estate fund assets, while the TER states the annual management costs for each investor in percent of the fund volume. Extraordinary payouts are defined as the monthly difference between the fund specific absolute payouts and the current NAV. The share of institutional investors is also considered. Morningstar provides the investment share of these investors for this purpose.
Moreover, the fund size in billion Euro as well as the monthly fund performance measured by the 12 month BVI-performance are also considered.
Industry-Wide
The invested capital in the overall asset class provided by BVI serves as an additional influential factor. The BVI collects data about net flows directly from its members and represents the vast majority of the German mutual fund industry. The dataset includes the monthly net flows of 48 public and institutional German open-ended real estate funds in the sample period. 11 Count variables for fund closures or liquidation announcements are constructed in order to further account for the asset class specific sentiment.
Macroeconomic Uncertainty
We use the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index for Europe by Baker, Bloom and Davis.
At first, the authors select two influential newspapers for each European country like "Le Monde" and "Le Figaro" for France, "Handelsblatt" and "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung"
for Germany etc. Thereafter, the authors count the number of articles including the items uncertain or uncertainty, economic or economy, and at least one policy-relevant item. The count is scaled by the overall number of articles in each newspaper. The Economic Policy Un- 
Descriptive Statistics
According to Table 2 , the NAV Spread shows a large heterogeneity between the funds. At the closing date, all funds exhibit a NAV Spread close to zero. In contrast, the TMW Immobilien Weltfonds fund displays a NAV Spread of about 60 % in January 2013. The average NAV Spread amounts to 31 %. The independent variables in Table 2 are separated in 3 categories: Fund Specifics, Industry-Wide and Macroeconomic Uncertainty. In addition, Figure 3 illustrates the progression of the average NAV Spread and all independent variables over time
The leverage ratio differs substantially between funds. The DEGI International fund reports a leverage ratio from zero in June 2014 while the Morgan Stanley P2 value fund exhibits a leverage ratio of 69 % at the beginning of 2014. The average leverage ratio of all funds is of 29.6 %. Figure 3 shows that the leverage ratio considerably diminishes over time.
Selling real estate assets is associated with the repayment of loans.
The liquidity ratio also shows a considerable heterogeneity. The TMW Immobilien Weltfonds fund displays a liquidity ratio of 0.5 % in November 2011, which deceeds the regulatory threshold of 5.0 % and is only allowed for a short period of time. However, this fund shows a considerably low liquidity ratio over the entire sample period. In contrast, the DEGI In-ternational fund has a rising liquidity ratio of 10 % at the closing date up to 62.5 % in 2014.
In parts, the fund's strategy causes these substantial differences. In the sample period, the DEGI International fund liquidates a significant portion of its assets without substantial extraordinary payouts until October 2014. On average, the liquidity ratio amounts to about 15.9 %. The tenancy rate serves as a proxy for the quality of the real estate properties as well as the operative asset management. The average tenancy rate amounts to 90.3 %. Higher tenancy rates suggest stable cash flows from the managed funds' assets. These funds may be less likely to devaluate vastly in the near future. We expect these funds to show lower NAV Spreads. Table 2 In order to enable a ceteris paribus interpretation for these effects, we employ a multivariate panel regression model in the next chapter. Moreover, we assume a certain lag structure for the independent variables in order to interpret their influences as causal effects.
Research Models and Methodology
Equation 1 + β 4 ∆ T enancy i,t−1 + β 5 ∆ T ER i,t−1 + β 6 Extraordinary P ayouts i,t−1 + β 7 Institutional i,t−1 + β 8 Institutional sq i,t−1 + β 9 Log F und Size i,t−1 + β 10 ∆ P erf orm i,t−1 + β 11 F lows Asset Class i,t−1 + β 12 Event F und Liquidation i,t + β 13 Event F und Closure i,t + β 14 P olicy U ncertainty Index Europe i,t−1
As stated before our research objective is to explain the NAV Spread in dependence of fund specific fundamentals as well as time specific economic indicators. In order to account for individual, cross-sectional heterogeneity as well as the time dimension, we employ a panel regression model with time fixed effects and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. We use the first differences (∆) of the leverage ratio, the liquidity ratio, the tenancy rate, the TER and the performance in order to correct for non-stationarity. Table 4 illustrates the results of the panel regression models (I-IV). The first model includes the fund-specific indicators (I). The second specification displays the fund-specific as well as industry-wide variables (II). The third model shows the fund-specific and the macroeconomic uncertainty variables (III). The final model includes all variables combined (IV).
Results
The significance and sign of all variables remain stable among all four models (I-IV), which indicate a robust model specification. 
Fund Specifics
The leverage ratio, the liquidity ratio and the share of institutional investors affects the NAV Spread, while the influences of the Economic Growth Target Markets variable, the tenancy rate and the management costs (TER) as well as the performance variable are statistically insignificant.
The leverage ratio (∆ Leverage i,t−1 ) increases the NAV Spread. An increase in the absolute difference of the leverage ratio by one percent leads on average and c.p. to a 0.290 percent larger NAV Spread in the next period.
The liquidity ratio (∆ Liquidity i,t−1 ) has a negative effect on the NAV Spread. A rise in the lagged absolute difference of the liquidity ratio by one percent leads on average and c.p. to a 0.361 percent lower NAV Spread. A larger share of cash and short term money market positions represent save money for fund investors. Larger liquidity ratios diminish the appraisal risk of the overall fund portfolio.
Real estate funds, which invest in well performing countries, should be more likely to see their assets appreciate in the future. Investors are informed about the target market mix by monthly, half-year and annual reports of the funds. Moreover, investors receive information about the economic development of the most important economies in the world by media.
13 Moreover, we controll for the passed time until the liquidation date and the legal fund environment (selling restrictions of the real estate properties) in the Appendix (Table 6) .
Both sources of information should lead in theory to higher demand for funds, which invest in prosperous markets, on the secondary market. Nevertheless, we cannot find a significant influence of the Economic Growth variable affecting the NAV Spread.
Extraordinary fund's payouts should have no influence. These payouts diminish the NAV and the stock market price in the same way. The effects are canceled out by taking the difference calculating the NAV Spread. Nevertheless, we find a significant impact of the extraordinary payouts. ( longer to obtain their capital and pay more fees, which justifies a larger NAV Spread.
The fund tenancy rates (∆ T enancy i,t−1 ) and the TER (∆ T ER i,t−1 ) as well as the past performance (∆ P erf orm i,t−1 ) remain insignificant. The tenancy rate in our model serves as a proxy variable for the quality of the funds real estate portfolio. In theory, an impairment of the real estate assets should be reflected in the NAV. The appraisal based NAV is reported with a time delay. Hence, changes in the tenancy rate could be recognized by investors before the more stale NAV is adjusted to changes in rental income. All funds in the dataset exhibit a high tenancy rate of at least 69 % up to 100 % with little variance over time.
Therefore, we only control for the different levels of the tenancy rates. Moreover, the effect of the management costs (TER) has also little variance over time. We could not confirm an impact of the fund's fees. 
Industry-Wide
Macroeconomic Uncertainty
We use the European Policy Uncertainty index (P olicy U ncertainty Index Europe i,t−1 ) to measure overall economic uncertainty. In contrast, we use the VIX (V IX Europe i,t−1 ) to measure the specific stock market risk. An increase in the Policy Uncertainty Index leads c.p. and on average to a larger NAV Spread in the next month. Moreover, we find a negative significant effect between the lagged VIX Europe and the NAV Spread. In contrast
to common stocks open-ended real estate funds are considered as a different asset class and profit from a more risky investment universe, since we already control for the overall economic uncertainty. 14 The overall economic uncertainty seems to be more important than the stock market uncertainty since the coefficient for the Policy Uncertainty Index is larger in amplitude compared to the VIX Europe coefficient. 
Conclusion
The event of a fund closure destroys up to 60 % of the value of the funds real estate portfolio.
We analyze the major factors of influence on the NAV Spread. We categorize the potential factors into three groups, namely (I) fund specifics, (II) industry-wide and (III) uncertainty.
We find that all three groups have a high explanatory power for the NAV Spread. Although there are notable differences between the individual funds (cross sectional heterogeneity), we find that the variance of the NAV Spread is mainly driven by time dependent influences, especially macroeconomic uncertainty. 18 Higher liquidity ratios and lower leverage ratios diminish the NAV Spread. A more conservative fund strategy by the fund's management help to decrease the NAV Spread. Moreover, the share of institutional investors has a significant influence on the NAV Spread. As expected, both, the closure and the liquidation of other funds lead to higher NAV Spreads of the particular fund. While higher overall economic uncertainty increases the NAV Spread, the stock market uncertainty ( Table 5 shows. different since the assets alone are not traded on the public market. Eventually, the event of a fund closure is accompanied by the loss of "buy-back guarantee" for the fund. Naturally, this induces uncertainty which requires a risk premium (the NAV Spread). We find that the level of uncertainty is primarily driven by the overall macroeconomic uncertainty and not by the structure of the fund itself. Fund managers should prevent the event of a fund closure at any cost since they have little control over the NAV Spread once a fund has closed. The figure illustrates the development of the time dummy coefficients over time for all four model specification. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table 4 displays the results of the panel model estimation with fixed effects and time dummies. Model (IV) exhibit the main results of the estimation including all significant variables. Model (I) -(III) displays the particular influence of fundamentals, industry-wide and macroeconomic uncertainty variables explaining the NAV Spread. * Variables are standardized with zero mean and a standard deviation of one. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
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Appendix
Regulatory Policy
Additionally, we consider the passed time to liquidate the entire real estate portfolio. Moreover, we use dummy variables to detect if the legal environment for distressed funds regarding the selling process affects the NAV Spread. The law regime in Germany authorises the fund's management to sell real estate assets in the first year of closing only deduction free. Afterwards the fund management can sell assets with a deduction of 10 % of the last appraisal value in the second year. Subsequently, a deduction of 20 % up to 30 % is authorised.
After the determined liquidation date, the fund's management is assigned to a depository bank, which can sell the assets without any restrictions. Moreover, this event causes an extraordinary tax burden for all investors, since land transfer tax applies. The fund's management needs time to sell the less profitable assets later with considerable sales deductions. In contrast, the fund's management could wait for a sellers market to sell their best and less profitable assets together. Hence, we do not know, when the particular funds sold their assets to the market. The legal environment seems to play no role in the course of the NAV Spread. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table displays two extensions of the main regression model (IV). Model (V) consider the time constraint of the liquidation process. Model (VI) shows the influence of the German regulatory policy restricting the fund's management ability to sell assets.
